An assessment of market position, advertising performance and the realistic growth levers available on Amazon UK.
Following the external audit commissioned by the brand, we carried out a full review using three independent data sources: Amazon Search Query Performance, a Data Dive competitive analysis of the fifteen leading products in the niche, and our own campaign data. The findings agree with each other, and they point somewhere different from where the audit pointed.
TPBS ads appear at top of search across 47% of all category search volume. The niche median is 4%. Only one of fifteen competitors runs heavier paid coverage. Visibility is not the problem this account has.
TPBS converts 6.6% of clicks into purchases. The category average is 32.1%. Shoppers are finding the listings and choosing something else, which is a price, review and proposition question rather than an advertising one.
The audit recommended scaling flavour and premium campaigns. We tested that thesis against market data. Flavour terms represent under 1% of category search volume, and TPBS already holds a leading share of them. There is no material volume behind that route.
Advertising efficiency is genuinely improvable and we have already begun. What advertising cannot deliver, at current price, review count and stock cover, is meaningful sales growth. That requires changes outside the ad account.
Data Dive comparison against the fifteen strongest competing products in the UK peanut butter category, including Pip & Nut, MANÍLIFE, PBfit, Whole Earth and Meridian.
| Measure | The Peanut Butter Store | Niche median |
|---|---|---|
| Price per jar | £8.00 | £7.85 |
| Minimum purchase price | £15.99 | £7.85 |
| Review count | 13 | 623 |
| Rating | 4.6 ▲ | 4.3 |
| Product variations | 11 ▲ | 2 |
| Listing age | 11 months | 4 yrs 1 mo |
| Sales, last 30 days | 138 | 1,467 – 3,440 |
| Revenue, last 30 days | £2,207 | £9,536 – £26,558 |
| Keywords ranking page one | 35% | 60% |
| Organic share of voice | 15% | 61% |
A 4.6 rating is the joint highest in the set, which tells us the product itself satisfies the customers who buy it. Eleven variations against a median of two gives unusual range for a young brand.
One fiftieth of the median review count and eleven months of listing history against a four year median. Note that per jar TPBS sits almost exactly at the category median. The gap is not what the product costs, it is that the smallest amount a new customer can spend with the brand is £15.99.
| Paid coverage | TPBS | Niche median |
|---|---|---|
| Keywords advertised | 35% | 19% |
| Keywords with top of search ads | 19% | 6% |
| Search volume covered at top of search | 47% | 4% |
This reframes the audit's central observation. High advertising spend relative to sales is not evidence of poor campaign management. It is what happens when a listing with 15% organic share of voice buys its way to visibility in a category where the typical competitor ranks organically and barely advertises. Pip & Nut sits on 90% organic share of voice and does not need to pay for the same traffic.
Verified against Seller Central, the last thirty days produced £2,213 of ordered product sales from 2,338 sessions, against advertising spend of approximately £1,320. Advertising is therefore funding around 60% of revenue. That ratio is sustainable only as a deliberate launch investment with a defined end point. It cannot be corrected by bidding alone, because the underlying reason for it is the gap between the brand’s organic position and its paid position.
Amazon Search Query Performance, Q2 2026, brand versus whole market.
| Funnel stage | TPBS | Market | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Click through rate | 0.76% | 1.69% | 2.2x behind |
| Basket adds per click | 22.7% | 61.1% | 2.7x behind |
| Purchases per click | 6.6% | 32.1% | 4.9x behind |
The gap widens at every stage after the impression, which tells us the issue is what shoppers see when they arrive rather than whether they arrive at all. The most likely cause is not the value of the product but the size of the first commitment it asks for.
| Search query | Quarterly volume | Market median price | TPBS price |
|---|---|---|---|
| peanut butter | 192,233 | £4.99 | £15.99 |
| nut butter | 10,371 | £4.99 | £15.99 |
| organic peanut butter | 7,940 | £6.39 | £15.99 |
| natural peanut butter | 2,893 | £5.95 | £15.99 |
The important distinction is per jar versus per purchase. At £8.00 a jar TPBS sits within pennies of the category median, so the product is not overpriced. What differs is the minimum transaction. A shopper can try Pip & Nut or MANÍLIFE for around £6.50 and Whole Earth for less. The cheapest way to try TPBS is £15.99 for two jars of the same flavour.
Five single flavour four packs drew 156 sessions last month and sold nothing. The Variety Pack, at a comparable basket size and price, converts at 5.8%. Same format, same price bracket, same brand. The only difference is whether the jars are the same flavour or four different ones. New customers will pay for a tasting box. They will not commit to four jars of one flavour from a brand they have not tried.
The audit identified flavour led and premium searches as the strongest opportunity to scale. We agree they are the most efficient traffic in the account. We tested whether they are large enough to build on, and they are not.
| Search query | Total market purchases, quarter | TPBS | TPBS share |
|---|---|---|---|
| flavoured peanut butter | 14 | 2 | 14.3% |
| salted caramel peanut butter | 38 | 3 | 7.9% |
| spicy peanut butter | 7 | 3 | 42.9% |
TPBS is not under invested in flavour searches. It already holds a leading share of them. Across the wider Data Dive keyword set, flavour terms account for roughly 1,500 of 159,283 search volume, which is under 1% of the category. Moving budget there would improve reported efficiency while reducing total sales.
Where the category volume actually sits: 73% in generic terms such as peanut butter, crunchy, smooth and organic, where the brand’s price position works against it. 27% in competitor brand names. A further 17% sits in powdered and protein peanut butter, a segment TPBS does not currently serve.
Stroopwafel searches carry high volume in the category data, but the intent behind them is the biscuit rather than the spread. Neighbouring queries are dominated by brands such as Daelmans and by terms like caramel waffles. We serve several thousand impressions into that demand and convert almost none of it, so we are treating those terms as spend to exclude rather than an opportunity to pursue.
We propose a measurable target of reducing total advertising cost of sales from approximately 60% toward 35 to 40% by the end of Q3, achieved by cutting waste rather than cutting visibility. This is deliverable within current stock constraints and is independently verifiable.
Thirteen reviews against a category median of 623 is the single largest structural gap and it suppresses conversion on every campaign we run. In order: enrol the parent ASIN in Amazon Vine, which is the fastest compliant route to roughly forty reviews. Switch on automated Request a Review on every order at five to seven days after delivery. Use Brand Registry customer engagement emails to bring trial buyers back for their chosen flavour. Add a compliant insert card covering brand story and customer service, with no incentive attached. This will not reach the category median, but moving from thirteen to forty crosses the threshold at which a shopper treats the brand as established rather than untested.
The catalogue contains a clear natural experiment. Five single flavour four packs drew 156 sessions in the last thirty days and sold nothing at all. The Variety Pack, at a comparable basket size and price, converts at 5.8%. The barrier for a new customer is not the amount they spend, it is being asked to commit to four jars of one flavour from a brand they have not tried. We recommend retiring or delisting the single flavour four packs, concentrating multipack demand on the Variety Pack as the trial route, and using Subscribe and Save to convert that trial into repeat purchase of a chosen flavour.
In the last thirty days, 215 sessions, which is 9.2% of all traffic, reached listings that sold nothing. That comprises the five single flavour four packs, a duplicate parent ASIN and a duplicated child listing. Consolidating these through Brand Registry recovers split ranking history onto the listings that actually sell and should be completed before Vine enrolment so new reviews land in one place. Separately, a legacy single jar listing has taken three orders from stock that was never deliberately sent in, most likely from a split carton at the fulfilment centre. It should be set inactive so it cannot take further orders the business is not set up to fulfil.
At 30 to 45 days of cover we cannot scale any campaign without risking a stock out that would cost more in lost rank than the additional sales are worth. Growth planning is not realistic until this is addressed.
The 4.6 rating and the breadth of the range say the product works, and per jar it is priced fairly against the category. The review count, the organic position and the size of the first order it asks for say the market has not yet been given an easy enough reason to try it.
Advertising can reduce waste, protect the brand term and hold efficient traffic. It cannot close a five times conversion gap on its own. The fastest route to growth runs through reviews, the trial route into the range, and stock, with advertising supporting those changes rather than substituting for them.
We would welcome a call to agree which of these we take forward together, and what success should look like by the end of Q3.